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Abstract
This paper develops an efficiency wage model to highlight public policy for relieving
unemployment. For the purposes of relief, we present unemployment benefits, public
employment programs and wage subsidies. The results show that unemployment benefits
have a negative effect on the employment rate, while public employment and wage subsidies
have a positive effect. The impact of these policies on social welfare is also considered.
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Many developed countries, including Japan since 1990, have endured long-run recessions
with persistent unemployment, a matter to which policymakers have paid particular atten-
tion. In this paper, we theoretically investigate some policies to stimulate the employment
rate. To explain high levels of unemployment, various models have been constructed. For
the purposes of our analysis, and following Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we use an eﬃciency
wage model, the prototype of which has been very widely applied.1 More recent studies
have incorporated the public sector explicitly within this type of model, noteworthy ex-
amples being Stiglitz (1999) and Sørensen (1999). However, these studies only analyze
the eﬀect of taxation and tax reform on employment, and they do not consider the role of
public expenditure policy. Only a few attempts have been made to incorporate and ana-
lyze public expenditure policy for relieving unemployment explicitly within an eﬃciency
wage model. Our contribution to the literature is to present a simple formal analysis,
incorporating a number of public sector policies aimed towards relieving unemployment
in general equilibrium.
In this paper, we present various policies to stimulate labor supply and demand, ﬁ-
nanced by a nondistortional tax (lump-sum tax). Unemployment beneﬁts and public
employment programs are considered for the former, while for the latter we evaluate wage
subsidies. The results show that an increase in unemployment beneﬁts and public em-
ployment programs decreases the level of employment by ﬁrms. This is because these
programs weaken workers’ incentives to exert eﬀort. Therefore, the ﬁrm decreases the
level of employment (that is, there is crowding out by the public sector). Consequently,
the employment rate is worsened through unemployment beneﬁts. However, a public em-
ployment policy improves the employment rate, since the policy increases self-employment.
Contrary to these results, wage subsidies have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrm sector employment.
This is because it increases redistribution from the unemployed to the employed. Thus,
policies for relieving unemployment introduce a conﬂict between workers and the unem-
ployed because of redistribution.
The paper also examines the eﬀects of these policies on social welfare. The ﬁndings
suggest that policies that decrease (increase) ﬁrm sector employment have a negative (pos-
itive) eﬀect on social welfare. The reasoning is as follows. To start with, public policy
infers redistribution between the employed and the unemployed. Therefore, social welfare
does not change in terms of income, ceteris paribus. However, if government policy de-
creases (increases) ﬁrm sector employment, there is a decrease (increase) in worker income.
This makes social welfare worse oﬀ (better oﬀ).
1See Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and Romer (1995, Ch.10) for further discussion.
2The paper itself is organized as follows. In section 2, we construct the model. Section 3
describes the market equilibrium and studies the impact of public policies on the economy.
We examine the social welfare eﬀects of the policy in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 The Model
We employ a version of the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)-type moral hazard or shirking
model that explicitly incorporates the public sector. The model describes an economy
with three sectors: households, ﬁrms, and government. We discuss each sector separately.
First, consider households. All risk-neutral workers are identical and receive utility
from wage income w > 0 but suﬀer disutility from eﬀort e ≥ 0. The instantaneous utility
of a worker is U = w−τ −e, where τ is a lump-sum tax. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
we assume that workers provide either e = 0 or a ﬁxed level of eﬀort e > 0.
If workers perform at the customary level of eﬀort, that is, they do not shirk, they
receive w − τ − e. If workers shirk, they are discovered and ﬁred for neglect of duty with
some probability, q, per unit of time. Workers must then choose either to provide eﬀort
or to shirk. Regardless of whether or not they shirk, workers are ﬁred without reason for
redundancy with some exogenous probability, b, per unit of time. Let us deﬁne VN (VS) as
the expected lifetime utility of an employed nonshirker (shirker). The discounted present
value of nonshirkers and shirkers are given by:
rVN = w − τ − e + b(VU − VN), (1)
rVS = w − τ + (b + q)(VU − VS), (2)
where VU is the expected lifetime utility of unemployed workers, and r is the discount
rate.
A worker will choose not to shirk if, and only if, VN ≥ VS, which is called the non-
shirking condition (NSC). VN = VS in equilibrium, and the nonshirking condition, using
(1) and (2), can be rewritten as:
w = τ +
b + q + r
q
e + rVU. (3)
We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium wage and employment level, and
the expected lifetime utility of unemployed households VU is the key variable. VU is given
by:
rVU = w − τ + a(VE − VU), (4)
3where w is a level of unemployment beneﬁts, a is the job acquisition rate, and VE is the
expected utility of employed households (VE = VN in equilibrium). Using (4), we can
rewrite the nonshirking condition (3)2:
w = e +
a + b + r
q
e + w. (5)
Now consider the ﬁrms, which are assumed to be identical, perfectly competitive ﬁrms
using labor as their only input. The production function is assumed to satisfy constant
returns-to-scale: F(L) = ALm, where A is the constant technology and Lm is the labor
level the ﬁrm employs. Suppose that the government pays the ﬁrm sw ad valorem where
s is the wage-rate subsidy. Firms decide upon labor demand so as to maximize proﬁts:
(A − (1 − s)w)Lm. Because of the constant return-to-scale technology, ﬁrms earn zero
proﬁts so long as labor demand has a positive ﬁnite value. Thus, the ﬁrm sector’s demand
for labor Lm satisﬁes 0 < Lm < ∞ if:
(1 − s)w = A. (6)
We assume that productivity is greater than the level of eﬀort: A > e.3
Assume the government has three policies available to mitigate the unemployment
problem: (i) an unemployment beneﬁts program, (ii) a public employment program, and
(iii) wage subsidies. These programs are ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax on households.
Suppose that the wage of workers employed by the government is equal to the wage of
workers employed by the ﬁrm. The government pays the wage w to public employment.
In equilibrium, we require this system to be balanced in every period, such that the
government’s budget constraint is given by:
τN = w[N − LT] + wLg + swLm, (7)
where LT = Lm + Lg is the aggregate level of employment, Lg is the public employment,
and N is the total labor supply.
3 Market Equilibrium
The rate a can be related to the more fundamental parameters of the model in a steady-
state equilibrium. In the steady state, the ﬂow into the unemployment pool bLm is equal
2VN ≥ VU is called the participation constraint. The participation constraint, using (1) and (4), can
be rewritten as w = w + e, which is not binding in equilibrium. Hereafter, we ignore the participation
constraint.
3If A < e, no one works in equilibrium. This paper does not consider this trivial case.
4to the ﬂow out of the employment pool a(N − LT), that is:
a =
bLm
N − (Lm + Lg)
. (8)
Substituting (7) and (8) into (5), we have the aggregate NSC:




N − (Lm + Lg)
+ ¯ w ≡ Φ(Lm), (9)
where Ω ≡ (b + q + r)e/q. We deﬁne the right-hand side of (9) as Φ(Lm).
3.1 Equilibrium
To illustrate the properties of this economy, we ﬁrst consider the no-policy case; i.e.,
w = 0, Lg = 0, and s = 0. From (9), the aggregate NSC is given by:




N − Lm. (10)
From (6) and (10), the employment level in equilibrium is decided by:
Lm¤ =
A − Ω
A − Ω + be/q
N < N.
In this case, we obtain the same characters of equilibrium as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
The comparative statics of each parameter are as follows. From (10), increasing the quit
rate b or decreasing the monitoring intensity q weakens workers’ incentive to exert eﬀort.
Therefore, the changes require an increase in the wage to induce individuals to work.
However, the ﬁrm cannot change the wage since A is ﬁxed: w = A. This implies that the
ﬁrm decreases the level of employment. Increasing the technology A leads to a rise in the
wage rate, and the employment level increases.
Next, consider the equilibrium in which programs exist. From (6) and (9), the equi-







N − (Lm + Lg)
+ ¯ w ≡ Φ(Lm), (11)
where Φ(Lm) has the following property: Φ(0) > 0,Φ(N − Lg) = ∞, and Φ0(Lm) > 0.
The equilibrium employment with these policies is depicted in Figure 1. This is implies
that Lm + Lg < N is satisﬁed.
53.2 Unemployment Beneﬁts and Public Employment Programs
In this subsection, we show the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts w and public employment
programs Lg on the employment level of the ﬁrm Lm. The policy parameters w and Lg
are related to the right-hand side of (11); Φ(Lm;w,Lg). If w rises, RHS of (11) increases;
that is, it shifts the RHS curve upwards; ∂Φ/∂w > 0. The increase in Lg has the same
eﬀect on RHS (11): ∂Φ/∂Lg > 0 as the increase of w (see Figure 1). Mathematically,










∂Φ/∂Lm < 0. (12)
When w or Lg increases, the loss of unemployment decreases. Therefore, the worker’s
incentive to exert eﬀort weakens. Since the optimal wage w is equal to A/(1 − s) from
(6), the ﬁrm reduces the level of employment Lm. These policies lead to a crowding out
of the employment level of the ﬁrm.
What eﬀect does such a policy have on the employment rate x? Let us deﬁne the
employment rate as x = (Lm +Lg)/N. From the above, the increase of w clearly leads to
a decrease in x because Lm falls: dx/dw = (dx/dLm)(dLm/dw) < 0. However, the eﬀect
of Lg on x is not obvious, since Lg raises employment as its own eﬀect though the rise of










If dLm/dLg > (<) − 1, the increase in Lg can lead to an increase (decrease) in the










= −Lm/(N − Lg) > −1. (13)
Since dLm/dLg > −1 is satisﬁed, the public employment Lg has a positive eﬀect on the
employment rate x; dx/dLg > 0. Accordingly, a public employment program can improve
the employment rate, but only through the crowding out of employment by the ﬁrm. This
implies that the increase in the level of employment through a public employment program
exceeds the decrease in the employment level of the ﬁrm.
3.3 Wage Subsidies
In this subsection, we analyze wage-rate subsidies as a policy to stimulate labor demand.4
Since the equilibrium is given by A/(1−s) = Φ(Lm), the eﬀect of wage subsidies s on Lm
4Production subsidies could also be considered to stimulate labor demand . However, they have a










The rise in the subsidy increases employment (and the employment rate; dx/ds = (dx/dLm)(dLm/ds) >
0) through an upward shift of the labor demand curve. This eﬀect is illustrated in Figure
2.
The increase in wage-rate subsidies is ﬁnanced by an increase in the lump-sum tax τ.
This implies income redistribution from the unemployed to the employed. Since the cost
of losing a job increases, workers have a stronger incentive to exert eﬀort. Therefore, the
ﬁrm increases the level of employment. It is then important for this policy to strengthen
the worker’s incentive to exert eﬀort, as against the unemployment beneﬁts and public
employment programs.
4 Welfare Analysis
We now consider the impact of the various policies on social welfare. As shown, on the
one hand, an unemployment beneﬁts program reduces the employment rate. On the other
hand, both a public employment program and wage subsidies increase the employment
rate. However, the eﬀect of these policies on social welfare is not obvious. Following
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we deﬁne social welfare UW as the sum of the employment
and the unemployment utility:
UW ≡ (w − τ − e)Lm + (w − τ)Lg + ( ¯ w − τ)[N − (Lm + Lg)].
Using the government budget constraint τN = ¯ w[N − (Lm + Lg)]+wLg +swLm, and the
ﬁrm’s optimal condition (1 − s)w = A, social welfare is rewritten as:
UW = [A − e]Lm( ¯ w,Lg,s), (15)
where Lm(·) represents the equilibrium value discussed in the previous section. Diﬀerenti-
ating (15) with the policy parameter, we obtain the eﬀect of each policy on social welfare.
Using the results in the previous section, we obtain:
dUW
d ¯ w














7Intuitively, the results are explained as follows. An increase of w and Lg decreases the loss
of unemployment, while the rise of s increases the loss of unemployment. It has a negative
(positive) eﬀect on the worker’s incentive to exert eﬀort, such that the ﬁrm decreases
(increases) the level of employment. These public policies then imply redistribution of
income through lump-sum taxation. However, if public policy crowds out ﬁrm sector
employment, ﬁrm sector employment income falls. Thus, even if a policy to increase the
employment rate is undertaken (such as a public employment program), the reduction
in ﬁrm sector employment reduces social income and worsens social welfare. On the
one hand, even though unemployment beneﬁts and public employment programs infer
redistribution from the employed to the unemployed, these policies worsen social welfare.
On the other hand, despite the fact that a wage subsidy is transferred to the employed
from the unemployed, the policy still improves social welfare.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper constructs an eﬃciency wage model that explicitly incorporates public pol-
icy to relieve unemployment. Several public policies are used to stimulate labor supply
and demand, the results demonstrating an eﬀect on ﬁrm sector employment and the em-
ployment rate. We show that both supply-side programs, namely unemployment beneﬁts
and public employment, induce a decrease in ﬁrm sector employment. However, unem-
ployment beneﬁts reduce the employment rate, whereas public employment increases it.
Demand-side programs in the form of wage subsidies are also found to have a positive
eﬀect on the employment rate. Finally, we show that policies that decrease (increase) ﬁrm
sector employment have a negative (positive) eﬀect on social welfare.
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Figure 2: The eﬀect of policy for labor demand (s)
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